Law Governing Arbitration Agreement Singapore
Posted on April 10, 2021
Despite the growing support for the test reported to Sulamérica, the severed cases show that there are differences in the way this test is applied. Some arbitration institutions have acknowledged uncertainty about the determination of the rule of law for arbitration agreements for which there is no explicit choice. For example, the ACICA rules and the LCIA rules provide that the right of headquarters, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise, governs the arbitration agreement.  With respect to the remedies or facilities that can be granted, the record indicates that an arbitral tribunal is entitled to grant any remedy or exemption that a Singapore high court could have ordered if the dispute had been the subject of civil proceedings before that court. This includes the allocation of interest. In this context, interest may be granted on a simple or compound basis for all or part of an alleged amount. An arbitral tribunal may also, if necessary, apply a contractual interest rate on amounts due under an agreement. Otherwise, there is no binding interest rate. To set a reasonable interest rate, arbitration tribunals are sometimes guided by the legal rate of a judgment in Singapore.
Subject to the consent of the parties or applicable institutional provisions, the court may award costs. The Tribunal is not required to meet the Tribunal`s taxing criteria and practices; However, the Tribunal can only accept reasonable costs in the circumstances of the case. Fees for these purposes include the costs of professional consultants and experts of the parties, court fees and expenses, as well as other oral proceedings and may include the costs of each relevant arbitration institution. While the Court of Appeal suggests that, had there been evidence that the parties had insuffed the effects of The Rpc law on the arbitration agreement, the Court could have taken into account the invalid effect of THE PRC law, it appears that this is still a departure from the approach of Sulamérica and BCY. The courts in both decisions did not appear to require such evidence where they arise from the effect of the consequences arising from the choice of the main contract of the law on the implied choice of the law of the main contract arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal held that there was no reason why these doctrines should not apply to arbitration, as purpose is also important in an arbitration context. A court is usually not only samples of cases that have already been defined in an arbitration, but a party may prohibit the increase of points before the court that could have been collected in the arbitration. The Court of Appeal found that the “extended” legal doctrine was likely to prevent a party from resurrecting arbitration agreement cases was “strongly” supported.
(ii) referee; and (iii) one of the parties could and should have been approached in an earlier proceeding that had already been closed. Unlike BNA/BNB, the Court of Appeal found that the starting point was the acceptance of the right to the seat and not the law of the material contract that governed the arbitration agreement. This presumption would be rebutted only by “powerful contrary reasons” and was supported by three main considerations.